1. Hungarians. Since autumn 1990 the problem of the Hungarian national minority (numbering almost 600,000) and the related issue of Hungarian-Slovak relations have been portrayed in an increasingly dramatic manner. Hungarian represent the largest minority in Slovakia (about 13 percent of the population). Ethnic Hungarians inhabit largely agricultural areas along Slovakia's southern borders. Paradoxically, a liberalization in the approach toward human rights, including freedom of speech, resulted in a worsening in Hungarian-Slovak relations following the events of 1989. A similar situation prevailed during the brief thaw prior to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. So-called "proletarian internationalism" did not allow these tensions to be aired, and they thus built up beneath the surface. On the other hand, the uncertainty brought about by economic transition on either side of the Hungarian-Slovak border has established an atmosphere conducive to nationalist propaganda.

Nationalism is spreading in both Hungary and Slovakia because generalizations about distinctions between the two peoples are being accepted, because civic and social cohesion and understanding of the law are fragile, and because the historic heritage involved in the relationship between the two peoples is being distorted. Several decades of exposure of Slovaks to "Magyarization," or the coercive integration of Slovaks into Hungary (from 1860 until the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918), are now being confused with the 1,000-year-long Hungarian rule over Slovakia (from 1907 until 1918). On the other hand, the mass deportation of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia following World War II, because Hungary had been an ally of Germany, remains for most Slovaks an unknown chapter in history.

Meanwhile, on the Hungarian side, voices are calling for the abrogation of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, from which current borders in the region are mostly derived, and for a refusal to conclude agreements acknowledging the inviolability of borders. The Hungarian approach to minorities, that has resulted in the decimation of the Slovak minority in Hungary is being used by so-called "nationally oriented" politicians in Slovakia to preach the principle of reciprocity, or similar treatment for minorities in Slovakia.

Relations between the two countries have been further marred by a dispute over the (initially joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian) Gab íkovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project. The Hungarian side (under pressure from environmentalists) backed out of the agreement immediately following the change in the political regime in 1989. However, the Czechoslovak Government (and subsequently the Slovak Government) continued to work to complete its share of the project. In the final analysis, the Gab íkovo-Nagymaros issue is an extremely political one for both sides.

In 1990 the Slovak Parliament, the National Council of the Slovak Republic, passed the Language Act, which enables a minority to use its own language as a second official language in communities where the minority represents at least 20 percent of the local population. Nationalist parties and movements unleashed a vitriolic campaign against this law, arguing that it put at risk the rights of Slovaks living in ethnically mixed areas.

The principal grievance of the Hungarian minority revolves around the education system. During the final period of Communist rule a number of schools in rural areas was closed in an effort to economize. Among these were Hungarian schools. This made teaching in the mother tongue of local populations in ethnically mixed communities more complicated. In some communities the measure affected ethnic Slovaks negatively, while ethnic Hungarians were put at a disadvantage elsewhere. On both sides, certain groups and individuals interpreted the resulting situation as an attack on their national identity.

The new, bilingual education system for national minorities that has been adopted by the present government has elicited protests from the Hungarian minority. Under the system, compulsory instruction in several subjects is carried out in Slovak in bilingual schools. The argument is that ethnic Hungarians would otherwise be at a disadvantage when they seek to continue their education or enroll in occupational training courses. The government has promised that Hungarian children will be offered the option to enter either a Hungarian school, or a bilingual one. Opponents view this promise with suspicion; they claim that the right to education in one's own language is being suppressed.

Training for teachers in schools where the language of instruction is Hungarian is carried out through the department of philosophy, Comenius University, Bratislava, or a special department at the Teachers College, Nitra. Naturally, teachers at minority schools include graduates of other institutions who are proficient in the minority tongue. The standard of teaching in the Slovak language in Hungarian schools is considered a problem. In these schools Slovak is usually taught by teachers whose mother tongue is Hungarian. Primary school graduates are sometimes unable to communicate in Slovak without great difficulty. However, such cases are often exaggerated in order to lend support to attempts to implement "solutions" which are too extreme.

Neither side has yet submitted a proposal for a national minority education system which, on the one hand, would ensure every pupil a command of Slovak so that the pupil would not face barriers to occupational advancement and, on the other hand, would not violate the right of the pupil to receive instruction in his or her mother tongue. This issue has also become politicized, and drastic approaches are being proposed by radical political groups among both Slovaks and Hungarians.

After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was admitted as a member of the Council of Europe provided that it complied with a number of conditions regarding the Hungarian minority. Recommendations concerned primarily the bilingual naming of towns and communities and the traditional Hungarian spelling of Christian and family names. Only recently have these conditions been generally met.

In March 1995 a basic bilateral treaty was signed by the prime ministers of Hungary and Slovakia. The most widely discussed article in the treaty concerns the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. According to the interpretation of the parliamentary opposition in Hungary, as well as the interpretation of some political leaders of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, this article gives the Hungarian minority the right to regional autonomy. According to the interpretation of the Slovak Government, this is not the case. It therefore appears that the treaty has not solved the controversy.

Survey findings show unequivocally that tolerance is significantly greater in areas in which Hungarians and Slovaks live together. Prejudice and hate appear to grow as the distance increases from ethnically mixed regions. Interview respondents expressed the conviction that the only feasible way to foster peaceful coexistence was to understand each other as profoundly as possible.

2. Gypsies. Although fewer than 82,000 individuals declared themselves as Gypsies for the 1993 Census, experts and Gypsy representatives estimate that the number of Gypsies in Slovakia is closer to 350,000 (Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republiv, 1994, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, p. 127).

A survey carried out in 1990 by the Statistical Office indicated that 65 percent of the Gypsies questioned considered themselves to be Gypsy, 18 percent, Slovak, and 17 percent, Hungarian. Gypsies differ from the rest of the Slovak population not only because of their origin, language, history and social structures, but also because of the age structure of the Gypsy population, which has a relatively high number of children and low number of elderly. Due to high birth and mortality rates, four-fifths of the Gypsy population is under 34 years of age.

From 1945 to 1989 all government policy approaches toward the problems of the Gypsy population were protective, paternalistic, and centralist. After 1989 a change occurred in the perception of the Gypsy minority. What was initially viewed as a social issue is now viewed primarily as a political one. An enormous number of political groups has emerged, all claiming to represent the interests of Gypsies, but none able to identify a viable common strategy. Moreover, these groups have become engulfed in disputes with one another.

Meanwhile, Gypsies are being used for the political ends of populist politicians by being offered selected welfare benefits. However, the fact that Gypsies receive more of certain benefits than does the rest of the population is not always a consequence of attempts to corrupt them. Sometimes, extra benefits are merely the result of administrative measures designed to comply with general social objectives. Nonetheless, the nontargeted distribution of these benefits makes abuses possible. Given their lifestyle and demographic characteristics, Gypsies are typically able to make better use of existing measures than is the rest of the population. Yet, access to these extra benefits often serves to diminish significantly the incentives for Gypsies to improve their lot.

For example, individuals who have never shown any interest in holding a job are also eligible for unemployment benefits under legislation passed in 1990 (previously, under Communism, "unemployment" did not exist, since full employment was guaranteed). In a situation of high unemployment, individuals with few skills can easily prove that no appropriate jobs are available to them. Similarly, the family allowance, which rises linearly as a function of the number of children in the family, frequently forms the largest single source of income for Gypsy families. This applies especially to families living in Gypsy villages in Eastern Slovakia, where it is not unusual for 100 percent of the adult population to be unemployed.

In general, the majority population harbors a strong sense of aversion toward Gypsies. Almost 80 percent of all respondents would rather not have a Gypsy as a neighbor (Sources: FOCUS surveys carried out in 1993, 1994). Racial prejudice is undoubtedly often behind this attitude. However, the stance is also frequently a result of a personal or vicarious experience of the real problems generated by the existence side-by-side of two entirely different cultures.

However, the Gypsy subculture is far from homogeneous. Gypsies residing in cities often enjoy above-average living standards. Some are successful artists, who are fully integrated in society and get on well with the people around them. Others have become rich in less obvious ways and are at odds with the law. By contrast, in rural areas there are still unsightly Gypsy settlements which lack electricity, drinking water, and other community services. The efforts undertaken by the Communists to relocate Gypsies from such communities to apartments in urban housing developments were unsuccessful, because they failed to take into consideration the fact that radical adjustments and changes, not only in the way of life of these Gypsies, but also in their value systems, were not feasible.

Children growing up in Gypsy communities are exposed to serious health hazards because of inadequate sanitation and hygiene, and malnutrition. Ensuring regular school attendance is also a serious problem. Cultural and linguistic differences are often considered, incorrectly, as signs of mental inadequacy and are used as an excuse to send Gypsy children to special schools. Segregation represents a real threat. Gypsy children are also handicapped in terms of mastering school subjects because of the inability of their parents to assist them. This occurs also because the system of schooling is still largely based on learning through homework assignments. After 1989 a special department was established at the Teachers College, Nitra, to train teachers who are specialized in the education of Gypsy children. A Romany Reader has also been developed with support from the Ministry of Education and Science.

In relative terms, Gypsies commit twice as many crimes as the general population. The percentage is even higher among Gypsy adolescents under 18 years of age. Slovak society is far from having reached a stage where it might consider statistics like these as a reason to provide assistance to the Gypsy population. On the contrary, in this period of social and economic uncertainty, these problems furnish arguments in favor of radical policy solutions which are a far cry from ideas of racial equality and humanism. These were the views expressed in autumn 1993 by Vladimír Me iar during his first term as prime minister of the Slovak Republic.

Before the 1992 elections, the Government Council for Nationalities was making relatively effective contributions in the search for solutions to the problems of Gypsies. All interested parties, such as the leaders of Gypsy associations and unions, as well as experts, emphasize the single underlying principle essential for any solution: the involvement of Gypsies themselves. As Klara Orgovanova said in her interview, Gypsies "must have a feeling that they are involved in determining their own destiny; they must have a sense of being co-responsible for public matters."

Note: The conclusions in this section are based primarily on the opinions of Peter Huncik, Peter Marianek, Klara Orgovanova, Jaroslav Poliach, Katarína Rimoczyova, Jozef Sikra and Zuzana Szatmary.